

Organization

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The Secretary of Defense recently announced changes in the unified command plan (UCP) which provides guidance to unified commanders; establishes missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delimits areas of responsibility; and specifies the duties of functional commanders. The new plan, which became effective on October 1, 1999, included the following changes:

- Assigns Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov to the area of responsibility of U.S. European Command.
- Assigns Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to the area of responsibility of U.S. Central Command.
- Identifies U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the successor to U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), with a mandate to provide forces with joint warfighting training and experience, leverage lessons learned in real and training scenarios, and recommend changes to joint doctrine to improve warfighting capabilities.
- Assigns JFCOM the responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction incidents within the continental United States and its territories and possessions. To fulfill that mission, a standing joint task force for civil support under JFCOM will plan and integrate DOD support to the lead Federal agency for consequence management during incidents. The standing JTF will be commanded by a two-star Reserve general/flag officer, with a small headquarters staff.
- Assigns the military lead for computer network defense to U.S. Space Command.
- Transfers selected water areas off Africa and Europe from U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. European Command.

Moreover the new plan contained a non-binding classified enclosure (UCP 21 Vision) outlining a flexible and evolutionary path for UCP revisions to accommodate changes in the anticipated threat environment. **JFQ**

BATTLE LABS

A senior steering group representing the services recently met to evaluate experimentation methods for joint warfighting. Hosted by the Joint Experimentation Directorate, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the meeting reviewed efforts to conduct joint experiments and transform joint operations. Toward that

end, 24 service battle laboratories and JFCOM have organized the Alliance of All Service Battle Laboratories to link labs and experimentation agencies which will share innovations. The alliance will promote debate and analysis of warfighting experimentation. Labs will take advantage of unique service capabilities and identify opportunities for collaboration and the steering group will determine which partnerships offer the greatest potential. The alliance plans further meetings and another senior steering group meeting is scheduled for May 2000.

JFCOM serves as the DOD executive agent under the Chairman for joint experimentation with a mission of creating and exploring new concepts as well as planning, designing, preparing, and assessing a program of joint warfighting experiments to enhance future capabilities. **JFQ**

Doctrine

JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Among the recent changes in the unified command plan (UCP), additional responsibilities for developing joint doctrine were assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), which is tasked to support the joint doctrine program by making recommendations on development, assessment, distribution, and maintenance of joint publications. The Joint Staff will promulgate program directives for joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP), act as the review authority, forward doctrine for signature, and manage above-the-line titles.

The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is tasked with facilitating the conceptualization, development, and revision of publications, analyzing proposed or approved publications, developing a mechanism to link assessments to doctrine, and coordinate or develop signature-ready below-the-line publications. Although the doctrine division of JWFC also will respond to JFCOM issues and priorities, it will continue the traditional role of honest broker through doctrine analysis, assessments, coordination, and exercise support. JWFC will be more involved in resolving contentious issues, but no authority has been transferred. **JFQ**

TECHNOLOGICAL INITIATIVES

The Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) initiative is an Internet-based distance learning program that provides instruction formerly available only in residence. There are ten DOCNET modules at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/tointer.htm> with a total of 32 planned for the end of 2001. This educational effort enables members of both the active and Reserve components to access doctrine without entering the classroom. The modules include interactive animation, case studies, video supplements, and self-testing on subjects such as operational art, joint fire support, and military operations other than war.

In addition, the Joint Staff has released a state-of-the-art interactive wargame on joint force employment. Issued on CD, it includes a six-phase crisis action planning process that runs from situation development through to execution. Players take on the role of a joint force commander and learn to apply joint doctrine in various conflict scenarios. The game enhances understanding of joint doctrine through exercises that challenge players to achieve the assigned mission. It tests knowledge and conducts a virtual joint operation employing doctrinal principles. It also contains ten baseline scenarios—plus four modifiable scenarios—which cover a range of military operations with extensive feedback at the end of each scenario. The practical application includes the ability to modify force parameters using an unlimited number of operational conditions. Some 6,500 copies of the wargame have been distributed to the services and unified commands (local reproduction of this CD is authorized). **JFQ**

DEPLOYMENT PUB

Although one usually thinks of high tech weapons in weighing combat power, the ability to project forces around the world is essential when wielding the military instrument. Joint Pub 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, provides guidance and principles on deployment and redeployment from peace to conflict situations.

This volume differs from most other joint pubs in that it provides guidance not only to the staff of the supported command, U.S. Transportation Command, and joint force commanders, but

(continued on page 106)

The Joint Publication System


Doctrinal Taxonomy

This hierarchy of publications provides a framework for joint doctrine and for joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). It is organized along traditional joint staff lines of responsibility. The first numeral identifies the functional field of a publication. The second numeral—preceded by a hyphen—places a pub in a given field (with a zero-digit designating the keystone pub in the series within any given field). The third numeral—preceded by a period—indicates pubs which furnish supporting or expanded joint doctrine or JTTP.

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CAPSTONE AND KEYSTONE DOCTRINE



SUPPORTIVE DOCTRINE AND



JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1-02	Financial Management during Joint Operations 1-06	JTP for Counterintelligence Support 2-01.2	JTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace 2-01.3	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 2-02	JTP for GGIS to Joint Operations 2-03	Offensive Counterair 3-01.2	Defensive Counterair 3-01.3	JTP for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 3-01.4	Joint Theater Missile Defense 3-01.5	Amphibious Operations 3-02	Landing Force Operations 3-02.1	Amphibious Embarkation 3-02.2	Joint Interdiction Operations 3-03	JTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations 3-04.1	Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 3-05.2	Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures 3-05.3	Joint Special Operations Targeting and Planning 3-05.5	Urban Operations 3-06	JTP for Foreign Internal Defense 3-07.1	JTP for Antiracism 3-07.2	JTP for Peace Operations 3-07.3	Joint Counterdrug Operations 3-07.4	JTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 3-07.5	JTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 3-07.6	JTP for Domestic Support Operations 3-07.7	JTP for Close Air Support 3-09.3	Joint Rear Area Operations 3-10	JTP for Base Defense 3-10.1	NBC Defense 3-11	Joint Nuclear Operations 3-12	Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 3-12.1	Nuclear Weapons Employment, volume I 3-12.2	Nuclear Weapons Employment, volume II 3-12.3	JTP for Space Operations 3-14	Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare 3-15	JTP for Theater Airlift Operations 3-17	Forcible Entry Operations 3-18	Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations 3-34	Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations 3-35	Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone 3-52	Joint Psychological Operations 3-53	Operations Security 3-54	National Search and Rescue Manual, volume II 3-50.1	Joint Combat Search and Rescue 3-50.2	JTP for Combat Search and Rescue 3-50.2.1	Evasion and Recovery 3-50.3	Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations 3-51	Joint Targeting 3-60	Public Affairs in Joint Operations 3-61	Strategic Attack 3-70	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 3-56.1	Civil-Military Operations 3-57	Civil Affairs 3-57.1	Military Deception 3-58	JTP for Meteorological/Oceanographic Support 3-59	Joint Targeting 3-60	Public Affairs in Joint Operations 3-61	Strategic Attack 3-70	JTP for Patient Movement 4-02.2	JTP for Sealift Support 4-01.2	Joint Bulk Petroleum 4-03	JTP for Movement Control 4-01.3	JTP for Theater Distribution 4-01.4	JTP for Water Terminal Operations 4-01.5	JTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) 4-01.6	JTP for Use of Intermodal Containers 4-01.7	JTP for JRSOI 4-01.8	Common User Logistics 4-07	Multinational Logistics 4-08	Global Distribution 4-09
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Abbreviations

C4 — command, control, communications, and computers
 GGIS — global geospatial information and services support
 JRSOI — joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
 JTF — joint task force

Tracking the Process

A *Common Perspective*, a newsletter published by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is a useful source for tracking joint doctrine development. This periodical can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/el/comm_per/comm_per.htm.

Legend

approved

under revision

under development

pending development

Total 112 joint doctrine publications



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also to other members of the Armed Forces with deployment responsibilities. The first half is addressed to decision-makers at the highest level, providing overarching guidance on roles, duties, and relations for both major commands and Federal agencies (such as the Departments of State and Transportation and U.S. Postal Service) which are involved in deployment and redeployment. The balance of the pub is valuable to those who exercise deployment responsibilities. Chapter III has specifics of planning and executing deployment while chapter IV covers redeployment. Chapter V considers enablers—processes, systems, and equipment—that facilitate mission accomplishment, such as the global decision support and the joint flow and analysis systems. Chapter VI discusses multinational efforts and operations other than war and chapter VII covers joint training, exercises, and assessments and their relation to national military strategy and the universal joint task list.

The appendices provide a primer on deliberate and crisis action planning and process maps of deployment and redeployment and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. They also contain information on time-phased force deployment data refinement and maintenance, illustrations of deployment and redeployment orders, and a glossary of terms.

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Lessons Learned

JOINT EXERCISES

The Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) of the Joint Staff administers assessments of preparedness by observing joint exercises and joint task force operations conducted under the sponsorship of the Chairman and unified commanders. Assessments carried out during fiscal year 1999 engaged almost every theater and observed a range of exercises.

One common thread ran through these assessments. Command, control, communications, and computer (C⁴) architectures were not fully integrated, but were overburdened and vulnerable to kinetic or computer attack. Moreover, systems were seldom fully interoperable with coalition partners and at times were incapable of being linked to national or CINC support systems. In addition, C⁴ systems were underfunded and undermanned.

The evolution of joint and service-unique global command and control systems (GCCS) is an illustration of the difficulty of integrating even a relatively well funded and universally accepted system. Although battle tested and an improvement over its predecessor, GCCS has yet to realize its full potential. Exercises demonstrate that users have adopted shortcuts, modifications, additions, and work-arounds that can negatively impact the system at large.

Some commands have properly initiated change, focusing on improvements at the local and holistic levels. During Global Guardian, observers chronicled planning by U.S. Strategic Command for a flexible, automated status of forces reporting system. The plan not only included developing elements for the CINC and his staff, but a protocol for ensuring the system would be compatible.

While established systems can operate with some degree of success when cohesive and long standing allied relations are established, the fact is that the next crisis is likely to occur when such a system is not in place. Joint task force (JTF) headquarters can bear the brunt of the expeditionary challenge since they must reconcile a number of issues under stressful, time-critical circumstances. Though the services have made great strides in developing and fielding a separate, deployable C⁴ element, forces do not have a comprehensive C⁴ suite optimized for the JTF expeditionary environment. In addition, JTFs are often largely made up of augmentees, drafted at the last moment and at times poorly qualified for the task at hand. Hence a good deal of on-the-job training is required in almost every exercise and JTF.

Inadequate commonality among the services and personnel shortfalls are also exacerbated by the lack of standardization with alliance partners. Such systems are further modified to optimize interaction between U.S. and allied forces. Ironically, modification all too often renders the system less compatible or inoperable with other U.S. systems.

The lack of joint standards for web based technologies complicates command and control. Such standards support activities including data transfers, command post connectivity, intelligence distribution, message handling, and distribution. Their absence often adds an unnecessary training and familiarization load. Until standards are developed and adopted, CINCs use locally developed guidelines, a solution which is at odds with a fully integrated, worldwide information network.

Implementing information operations with advanced technologies also emerged as an area of concern. Standards have been developed and are being integrated into the toolkits of the unified commands. But in many cases personnel and other assets are unavailable to develop meaningful programs, and work-arounds that depend on manual methodologies and techniques are being used. In addition to resource constraints, many warfighters in the field and fleet are reluctant to fully rely on technology to drive information operations. Noncommissioned officers, action officers, and senior officers candidly expressed some reluctance during assessments to go too far with technology in the event that systems may fail when needed.

Despite some successes, the challenge is too great for any CINC or command to resolve. Exercise observations suggest that a renewed commitment to developing, funding, standardizing, and manning C⁴ systems is required.

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Education

READING LIST

The following articles of interest to the conduct of joint operations have recently appeared in professional military journals:

■ Michael G. Dana, "The JIATF Fusion Center: A Next-Generation Operations Cell for Consequence Management," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 84, no. 2 (February 2000), pp. 38–41. Proposes joint interagency task forces to integrate military, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations to support disaster relief.

■ L.P. James, "No Silver Bullet in Missile Defense," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 125, no. 12 (December 1999), pp. 39–43. Two views on ballistic missile defense, the attack operations school and the active defense school.

■ Edward Rhodes et al., "Forward Presence and Engagement Historical Insights into the Problem of Shaping," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 25–61. Lessons learned on conducting effective regional engagement.

■ Robert J. Smullen, "Reinventing Fixed-Wing CAS," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 84, no. 3 (March 2000), pp. 52–53. Adapting to technological changes in close air support.

■ David Mets, "Elephants and Blindness: Fodder for the Air Warrior/Scholar on the Gulf War," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Spring 2000), pp. 53–69. Recent scholarship on Desert Storm.

■ Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?" *Parameters*, vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 69–81. Ideas on a failed planning system.

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